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Immigrants, Markets, and Rights: 
The United States as an Emerging Migration State 
James F. Hollifield∗ 
Valerie F. Hunt∗∗ 
Daniel J. Tichenor∗∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of World War II immigration in the core industrial 
democracies has been increasing. The rise in immigration is a 
function of market forces (demand-pull and supply-push) and kinship 
networks, which reduce the transaction costs of moving from one 
society to another. These economic and sociological forces are the 
necessary conditions for migration to occur, but the sufficient 
conditions are legal and political. States must be willing to accept 
immigration and to grant rights to outsiders. How then do states 
regulate migration, in the face of economic forces that push them 
toward greater openness, while security concerns and powerful 
political forces push them toward closure? States are trapped in a 
‘liberal’ paradox—in order to maintain a competitive advantage, 
governments must keep their economies and societies open to trade, 
investment, and migration. But unlike goods, capital, and services, 
the movement of people involves greater political risks. States must 
maintain control of their borders (a degree of political and legal 
closure), lest they risk undermining the social contract and the liberal 
state itself. The central challenge is how to maintain openness and at 
the same time protect the rights of individuals, citizens as well as 
denizens. 
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In the liberal democracies today, rights are the key to regulating 
migration, as states strive to fulfill three key functions: maintaining 
security, building trade and investment regimes, and regulating 
migration. The garrison state was linked with the trading state in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries have seen the emergence of the migration state, where 
regulation of international migration is as important as providing for 
the security of the state and the economic well being of the citizenry. 
In the case of the United States, with the gradual rollback of the 
national origins quota system in the 1950s and its eventual repeal in 
1965, U.S. immigration policy became increasingly liberal and 
expansive. This liberalization continued throughout the 1980s and 
was reinforced by the passage of the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act (IRCA) of 19861 and the Immigration Act of 1990,2 both 
of which opened the door even wider to immigration. A new round of 
restrictionism began in the 1990s with the passage of Proposition 187 
in California,3 designed to limit access of immigrants to public 
services, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) of 1996,4 which curtailed welfare and 
due process rights of legal and illegal immigrants. Despite these new 
restrictionist policies, the fourth wave of immigration in U.S. history 
continued unabated into the twenty-first century. What has sustained 
this long period of expansion in U.S. immigration policy? 
One explanation is that immigration is closely tied to the business 
cycle and the performance of labor markets in the sending and 
receiving countries. What we have found is that economic (push-pull) 
forces explain much of the variation in levels of immigration (flows) 
until the 1950s. From the end of the 1950s, however, policy effects 
(on flows) have increased. We argue that these increasing effects and 
the break with the business cycle are linked to the rise of rights-based 
 
 1. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1160, 1187–
88, 1255a, 1324a–b, 1364–65 (2006). 
 2. The Immigration Act of 1990, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186b, 1252b, 1254a, 1288, 1304, 1324c; 
29 U.S.C. § 2920 (2006). 
 3. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187 (West). 
 4. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) of 
1996, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225a, 1229, 1229a–c, 1231, 1324d, 1363a, 1365a, 1366–74, 1623–24; 18 
U.S.C. §§ 116, 611, 758 (2006). 
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politics and an increasingly active federal judiciary, which moved 
away from the tradition of non-interference in immigration policy. 
We are able to document the rise and decline of rights-markets 
coalitions through an analysis of roll-call voting in Congress. We 
demonstrate the impact of civil rights politics on immigration and 
refugee policy, from the 1965 Act through the 1986 and 1990 Acts. 
The coalitions which formed around issues of rights and markets 
(votes on trade and immigration in particular) create what has been 
called “strange bedfellow” coalitions, of left-liberals (Democrats) and 
libertarian-conservatives (Republicans).5 These coalitions helped to 
sustain liberal immigration and refugee policies, until the end of the 
Cold War. But the end of the Cold War has led to the breakdown of 
these coalitions. 
In much of the immigration literature, politics and states are 
assigned at best a marginal role in migration theory.6 According to 
the logic of push-pull, changing economic conditions (demand-pull 
and supply-push) in sending and receiving countries largely dictate 
levels of immigration in countries like the United States.7 Likewise 
the sociological literature on immigration stresses the growth of 
transnational, informational, and kinship networks, which facilitate 
cross-border movements.8 Since there has been a virtually unlimited 
supply of migrants ready to cross international borders in the postwar 
period (a more or less constant supply-push), most adherents to the 
economic model contend that shifting demand for foreign labor is the 
primary determinant of immigration flows (a variable demand pull). 
In this logic, major shifts in the volume of immigration are driven by 
 
 5. Aristide Zolberg, Reforming the Back Door: Perspectives Historiques sur la Réforme 
de la Politique Américaine d’Immigration, in LOGIQUES D’ETAT ET IMMIGRATION 221 (Paris: 
Editions Kimé, 1994). 
 6. See, e.g., James F. Hollifield, Immigration and the French State, 23 COMP. POL. 
STUD. 56, 56–79 (1990); Alejandro Portes, Immigration Theory for a New Century: Some 
Problems and Opportunities, 31 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 799, 799–825 (1997). 
 7. See Philip Martin & Elizabeth Midgley, Immigration to the United States: Journey to 
an Uncertain Destination, 49 POPULATION BULL. 2, 2–45 (1994). 
 8. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, RAFAEL ALARCON, JORGE DURAND & HUMBERTO 
GONZÁLEZ, RETURN TO AZTLAN: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FROM 
WESTERN MEXICO (1987); SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION (1996); Alejandro Portes, Transnational Communities: Their Emergence and 
Significance in the Contemporary World-System, in LATIN AMERICA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 
(1996). 
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the labor market demands and the business cycles in receiving 
countries. At the same time, the economic model assumes that 
government actions designed to control immigration are of little or no 
explanatory importance. Either policy interventions by national states 
merely rubber-stamp labor market demands and the business cycle, or 
they have no effect because they defy these determining economic 
forces.9 Sociological theories of immigration to some extent replicate 
the basic microeconomic logic of push-pull, but with the major 
innovation that international migration is heavily dependent on the 
development of informational and kinship networks between the 
sending and receiving communities.10 Neither economic nor 
sociological arguments leave much room for the state or public policy 
as major factors affecting immigration flows. 
Our research on immigration to the United States demonstrates the 
independent effects of policy change on immigration flows. 
Employing a time-series model that enables us to separate economic 
and political effects on immigration to the United States from 1891 to 
2003, we find that both policy interventions and changing U.S. 
economic conditions have a significant impact on legal immigration 
flows. In particular, our model suggests that shifts in unemployment 
and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had a sizeable and significant 
effect on levels of legal immigration until 1945. During the postwar 
years of 1946–2003, however, the effects of unemployment and GDP 
on immigration flows weaken over time while the impact of 
government interventions significantly increases.  
These findings, we argue, are supported by considerable evidence 
that federal policies, which significantly influenced immigration 
flows after the Second World War, won important support from 
national officials whose goals reached well beyond the demands of 
the labor market or business cycle. Against the backdrop of Cold War 
competition, executive and congressional officials after 1945 came to 
view immigration control as an important instrument for advancing 
 
 9. See JULIAN SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION (1989). 
 10. See MASSEY, ALARCON, DURAND & GOZALEZ, supra note 8; Portes, supra note 8; 
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, JORGE DURAND & NOLAN J. MALONE, BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: 
MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 15–21 (2002). 
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American foreign policy objectives.11 Anti-communism animated 
contending immigration policy camps in the late 1940s and 1950s.12 
Congressional isolationists successfully defended biased national 
origins quotas and established new ideological exclusions in the early 
1950s, despite economic conditions that were conducive to large-
scale immigration.13 By contrast, internationalists in the White House 
and Congress expanded refugee admissions and ended Asian 
exclusion in order to enhance American power and prestige abroad.14  
By the 1960s, New Frontier and Great Society reformers 
dismantled restrictive national origins quotas in the name of 
advancing racial justice and equal rights.15 Immigration reform in 
1965 expanded alien admissions to reunify families, provide a haven 
for refugees fleeing communist regimes, and to offer new 
immigration opportunities for ethnic and racial groups long 
discriminated against in American immigration law.16 During the 
1980s, new reforms dramatically expanded immigration. They were 
propelled by an unlikely coalition of liberal lawmakers, who 
embraced human rights and ethnic fairness in national immigration 
policy, and free market conservatives in Congress and the executive 
branch, who saw immigration restriction as antithetical to ‘regulatory 
relief’ and open markets. Finally, the federal courts became 
increasingly active after the 1960s in protecting the due process rights 
of aliens in admissions, asylum, and deportation proceedings.17 The 
development of American immigration policy in the postwar era, 
then, captures changing U.S. economic conditions as often less 
consequential than policy interventions by various actors of the 
national state. Indeed, as we shall see below, national officials at 
times have promoted immigration policies that run counter to 
economic trends in the United States. 
 
 11. DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN 
AMERICA 177–78 (2002). 
 12. Id. at 179. 
 13. Id. 
 14. TICHENOR, supra note 11. 
 15. Id. at 207–16. 
 16. Id. at 218. 
 17. PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS (1998). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The strong impact of changing U.S. economic conditions on 
immigration flows before 1945 and the larger significance of state 
actions in subsequent years underscore the need for greater 
theoretical balance in the scholarly literature on immigration. In the 
pages that follow, we will develop the concept of the migration state 
and examine U.S. immigration trends from the late nineteenth 
century up to 2003 in light of labor market dynamics and the business 
cycle. We then look at the emergence of the United States as a 
migration state and the rise of rights-based politics and rights-markets 
coalitions in the period from 1945 to 1990. These coalitions in the 
U.S. Congress are key to understanding immigration policy outputs 
and outcomes. The argument can be generalized to cover other liberal 
democracies in Western Europe, Canada, and Australia.  
I. THE LIBERAL PARADOX 
The United States, like other liberal democracies, is trapped in a 
“liberal paradox”.18 Since the end of World War II, international 
economic forces (trade, investment, and migration) have been 
pushing these states toward greater openness, while the international 
state system and powerful (domestic) political forces push states 
towards greater closure. This is a distinctly liberal paradox because it 
highlights some of the contradictions inherent in liberalism—the 
quintessentially modern political and economic philosophy and a 
defining feature of globalization. Since the 18th century when Adam 
Smith laid down the precepts of economic liberalism in his treatise, 
The Wealth of Nations, the ideology of free trade has come to 
dominate international relations. With Britain’s rise to power—which 
reached its zenith in the Victorian era of the late 19th century—and 
America’s dominance of the post-World War II international system, 
it has become increasingly difficult to refute Smith’s argument that 
laissez-faire economics and free trade are the best ways to enhance 
the wealth, power, and security of the nation-state.19 The debacle of 
 
 18. JAMES F. HOLLIFIELD, IMMIGRANTS, MARKETS AND STATES: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF POSTWAR EUROPE (1992). 
 19. In this context, it is important to remember that Smith was not worried about high 
levels of international migration, because as he put it “man is of all sorts of luggage the most 
difficult to be transported.” ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol27/iss1/3
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World War I and its aftermath of isolationism, intense nationalism, 
protectionism, and depression only served to reinforce this lesson. 
After 1945, the victorious western democracies, led by the United 
Kingdom and the United States, were determined not to repeat the 
mistakes of the 1920s and 1930s, and set about constructing a new 
international order, based on liberal principles of free trade and 
respect for fundamental human rights.20  
Despite these multilateral developments, the source of power and 
authority in international relations continues to revolve around the 
nation-state. Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the international 
legal system has been based upon the inviolability of the nation-state. 
In the Grotian tradition of international law, in order for a state to 
exist, it must have a territory, a population, and the capacity for self-
governance. Once a state has fulfilled these criteria, it may be 
recognized as independent and thus takes on the legal attribute of 
sovereignty, which Stephen Krasner wryly describes as “organized 
hypocrisy.”21 If a state is sovereign, it has a legal personality and the 
capacity to enter into relations with other states.  
Transnationalism, in the form of trade, cross-border investment, 
and migration, can challenge the sovereignty and authority of the 
nation-state. Migration in particular represents a challenge, in the 
sense that the (unauthorized) movement of individuals across national 
boundaries can violate the principle of sovereignty, which requires a 
degree of territorial closure.22 In every region of the globe—with the 
partial exception of Western Europe—borders are sacrosanct and 
they represent a fundamental organizational feature of the 
international system.23 Unlike trade in goods or the flow of 
international finance, migration can change the ethnic composition of 
 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 87 (Ludwig von Mises ed., Regnery Publishing 1999) (1776). 
 20. See generally RICHARD ROSECRANCE, THE RISE OF THE TRADING STATE (1986); 
DAVID JACOBSON, RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS: IMMIGRATION AND THE DECLINE OF 
CITIZENSHIP (1996). 
 21. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999). 
 22. See James F. Hollifield, Entre Droit et Marché, in LE DEFI MIGRATOIRE: QUESTIONS 
DE RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES (1994) 59; SASSEN, supra note 8. See generally CHRISTIAN 
JOPPKE, CHALLENGE TO THE NATION-STATE: IMMIGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE 
UNITED STATES (1998). 
 23. See generally PETER ANDREAS & TIMOTHY SNYDER, THE WALL AROUND THE WEST: 
STATE BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION CONTROLS IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA (2000). 
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societies and disrupt what Rey Koslowski aptly describes as the 
“demographic boundary maintenance regime.”24 If too many 
foreigners reside on the national territory, it may become difficult for 
a state to identify its population vis-à-vis other states. The national 
community may feel threatened, and there may be a social or political 
backlash against immigration. Finally—and this is most important 
from the standpoint of political liberalism—the citizenry or the demos 
may be transformed in such a way as to violate the social contract, 
undermine the legitimacy of the government, and challenge the 
sovereignty of the state itself.25 Thus migration can be seen as a threat 
to national security and can lead to conflicts within and between 
states.26 Hence the liberal paradox: the economic logic of liberalism 
is one of openness, but the political and legal logic is one of closure.27  
To better understand the liberal paradox and how it drives 
immigration policy, especially in the United States, we look at the 
causes and consequences of immigration and the ways in which the 
United States has tried to regulate migration in an era of 
globalization, with an eye to understanding the evolution of the 
migration state. In international relations theory, states are defined 
primarily by their security or military function. The Westphalian state 
is above all else a garrison state. Realists like Hans Morgenthau28 
and neo-realists like Kenneth Waltz29 view the state as a unitary 
rational actor, with the overriding responsibility to maximize power, 
protect its territory and people, and pursue its national interest. 
However, at least since the beginning of the industrial revolution in 
Europe, the state has increasingly taken on an economic function. 
Ensuring material wealth and power has required states to risk greater 
 
 24. REY KOSLOWSKI, MIGRANTS AND CITIZENS: DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN THE 
EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM (2000). 
 25. See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM 
AND EQUALITY (1983). 
 26. See generally MYRON WEINER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND SECURITY (1993); 
Samuel P. Huntington, The West: Unique, Not Universal, 75 FOREIGN AFF. (No. 6) 28, 28–46 
(1996). 
 27. James F. Hollifield, Migration and the “New” International Order: The Missing 
Regime, in MANAGING MIGRATION: TIME FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL REGIME 75, 96 (Bimal 
Ghosh ed., 2000). 
 28. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND 
PEACE (1978). 
 29. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979). 
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economic openness, and to pursue policies of free trade, giving rise to 
what Richard Rosecrance30 has called the trading state. As a result, 
states have been partially liberated from their dependence on territory 
and the military as sources of power. International relations theory 
has moved away from the narrow realist view of the state, 
recognizing that in an increasingly interdependent world, power is 
more diffuse.31 In this neo-liberal view, states are increasingly linked 
together by international trade and finance, forcing them to alter their 
grand strategies and seek new ways to cooperate. Here we argue that 
migration and trade are inextricably linked—two sides of the same 
coin. Hence the rise of the trading state necessarily entails the rise of 
the migration state, where considerations of power and interest are 
driven as much by migration (the movement of people) as they are by 
commerce and finance. 
II. IMMIGRATION AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
Many immigration scholars ignore politics and presume or assert 
that immigration is a function of market forces, as defined by the 
supply-push of sending countries and the demand-pull of receiving 
countries.32 While supply-push factors in sending countries 
undoubtedly influence immigration flows, an unlimited supply of 
migrants have been ready to cross national borders when 
opportunities have presented themselves in receiving countries 
throughout the past century. As a result, changing economic 
conditions in receiving countries are assumed to have the greatest 
effect on immigration. Martin and Midgley, for instance, neatly 
capture these theoretical predilections and findings in much 
immigration research. Their work aims to show that the number of 
immigrants who have come to the United States over time has 
fluctuated largely with economic conditions. Such assumptions are 
not reserved to academic circles; they abound in popular discourse 
and in the media. Popular newspapers like The Economist and The 
 
 30. ROSECRANCE, supra note 20. 
 31. See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INDEPENDENCE: 
WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION (1977). 
 32. See Martin & Midgley, supra note 7, at 21; SIMON, supra note 9. 
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Wall Street Journal have observed that immigration to the United 
States is best understood as a function of changing economic 
conditions. 
But it is our contention that the state and public policy have over 
time had an important impact on flows and we seek to understand the 
relationship between immigration and the business cycles in the 
United States. We want to know how the actions and policies of the 
American state have influenced immigration independent of 
economic conditions. Figures 1–4 depict trends in legal immigration 
to the United States, percent change in real GDP, and fluctuations in 
the unemployment rate. Immigration decreased from about 600,000 
per annum in 1892 to 250,000 by the end of the decade. This decline 
coincided with the 1893–97 recession, affirming the responsiveness 
of immigration flows to economic conditions.  
Figure 1. Unemployment, Real GDP and U.S. Legal Immigration, 1891-2003
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Immigration rebounded strongly at the turn of the century, as did 
the economy, reflected in positive growth trends, and shorter and 
shallower economic cycles (excepting 1908). Meanwhile in the labor 
market, unemployment rates were historically well below the 
average. In short, demand-pull factors were especially conducive, and 
immigration flows reached record levels. Indeed the foreign-born 
population of the United States climbed to 15%, an all-time high. No 
major immigration legislation was passed during this period, except 
for literacy tests imposed by Congress in 1917, restrictions that were 
rendered moot by the effects of the First World War, which 
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parenthetically abruptly ended the so-called third wave of American 
immigration.  
In the interwar years, immigration revived but fluctuated 
markedly—perhaps in reaction to the volatile economic conditions of 
the ‘Roaring ‘20s’. The 1924 Immigration and Naturalization Act33 
(also known as the Johnson-Reed Act) brought the nation’s first 
permanent and sweeping numerical limits on immigration. These 
restrictive measures codified the national origins quota system, 
writing racial bias (in favor of northern and western Europeans) into 
law.34 The new measures also introduced skill-based, human capital 
criteria into immigration policy for the first time. Nevertheless, 
countervailing economic forces, for example, low unemployment, 
apparently dampened the effects of the 1924 Act. The migration mix 
began to shift away from Europe and toward the Western 
Hemisphere, with Canadians and Mexicans comprising the largest 
number of newcomers. 
The onset of the Great Depression in 1929–30 demonstrates quite 
clearly the powerful effect of business cycles on immigration flows in 
the pre-1945 period. Demand-pull forces ceased virtually overnight, 
as the economy shrank and unemployment soared (see Figure 1). 
Annual immigration remained markedly low during the economic 
hard times of the 1930s.  
The recovery of the American economy during the Second World 
War led to a rapid decline in unemployment rates and a surge in 
GDP, but no real increase in legal immigration. Adherents of the 
push-pull model can account for these outcomes by emphasizing the 
anomalous and exceptional effects of global warfare that cut the 
United States off from traditional sources of immigrant labor. 
Tellingly, various U.S. employers turned to Mexican and Central 
American guestworkers to address growing labor market demands—a 
 
 33. Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924) (repealed 
1952). 
 34. See DESMOND KING, MAKING AMERICANS: IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND THE ORIGINS 
OF THE DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 286 (2000) [hereinafter KING, DIVERSE DEMOCRACY]; 
DESMOND KING, THE LIBERTY OF STRANGERS: MAKING THE AMERICAN NATION 12 (2005) 
[hereinafter KING, AMERICAN NATION]. 
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trend that was codified in the 1942 Bracero program that continued 
until 1963.35 
As a way of further illustrating the relationship between 
immigration and the business cycle during the period from 1890 to 
1945, bivariate correlations were calculated. These reveal no 
significant association between percent change in real GDP and 
immigration flows; however, there is a correlation (r = -0.425; 
significant at .01 level) with changes in the unemployment rate. This 
suggests that immigration was sensitive to demand-pull forces, even 
though the overall performance of the American economy (in terms 
of national income) had less effect in this regard. 
During the postwar years of 1945 to 2003, we see in Figure 2 that 
immigration has slowly trended upward for virtually the entire era, 
producing the so-called fourth wave in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
United States is now well into the fourth great wave of immigration 
in its history. Strikingly, immigration flows did not expand markedly 
in the early 1950s (1950 and 1952 witnessed declining immigration 
numbers) despite significant increases in GDP and new lows in 
unemployment—economic conditions deemed conducive by the 
economic push-pull model to increased immigration. Just as 
intriguing is the gradual increase in immigration during the 1970s and 
early 1980s, a time when unemployment levels were rising in 
connection with the two oil shocks and the steep recession that 
followed. U.S. immigration, however, began to soar in the late 1980s 
amid declining unemployment and fluctuating GDP; whereas sharply 
rising immigration continued unabated in the 1990s despite increased 
unemployment and substantial drops in GDP.  
 
 
 35. KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND 
THE INS (1992). 
Figure 2. Legal Immigration to the United States,  FY1946–2003
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Figure 4.  Annual Growth Rate of U.S. National Economy (Percentage Change of Real GDP), 
1946-2003
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If we look at simple bivariate correlations for the postwar period 
(1946–2003), we again find no significant relationship between 
percent change in GDP and flows. Although there seems to be a 
significant relationship between labor market performance (as 
measured by the unemployment rate) and immigration flows, the 
correlation (0.27, significant at the .01 level) is the opposite of what 
we would expect. How can we account for U.S. immigration trends 
over the past century that defy or elude the predictions of the 
economic push-pull model? The influence of policy interventions by 
the American government on immigration may help us fill in some of 
these theoretical gaps, a subject to which we now turn. 
Figure 3. Unemployment Rate in the United States, 1946-2003
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III. THE UNITED STATES AS A MIGRATION STATE 
Throughout its history the United States has relied heavily upon 
immigration for purposes of westward expansion, settlement, 
colonization, and economic development. It is no exaggeration to say 
that immigration has played a critical role in national development 
and U.S. grand strategy, and the country is now well into the fourth 
great wave of immigration in its history. The question we seek to 
answer in this section is to what extent immigration was a function of 
economic pull, growth and development—mirroring the business 
cycle—and to what extent it was promoted, managed, and regulated 
by the American state.  
From the 1890s through the Second World War, levels of 
immigration to the United States correspond closely with the 
performance of the American economy. Indeed, the time-series 
model we present below suggests that shifts in levels of 
unemployment and real GDP were among the most significant 
influences on annual immigration totals before 1945. Yet even as the 
traditional push-pull model goes far in helping us to explain U.S. 
immigration trends before mid-century, the unprecedented activism 
of the national state in these decades had a marked effect on the 
nature of immigration flows. The dramatic decline of immigration 
during American involvement in the First and Second World Wars 
highlights the extent to which the U.S. government’s pursuit of 
foreign policy objectives may profoundly transform migration trends. 
Moreover, if changes in the American labor market and business 
cycle before mid-century go far in helping us to explain how many 
immigrants were admitted in these years (immigration volume), they 
do not help us understand significant shifts in who was granted entry 
during these decades (immigration composition).  
For most of the nineteenth century, the U.S. federal government 
maintained an essentially laissez-faire immigration policy, with most 
regulatory authority devolving to states and localities.36 When the 
 
 36. See EDWARD P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 
POLICY, 1798–1965 (1981); Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration 
Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993); LAWRENCE FUCHS, THE AMERICAN 
KALEIDOSCOPE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND THE CIVIC CULTURE (1990); SCHUCK, supra note 17; 
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national state first developed the legal and administrative means to 
regulate immigration in the late nineteenth century, its efforts to 
control immigration often were motivated as much by a devotion to 
ethnic and racial hierarchy as by a concern for the country’s 
economic and national security interests.37 Against the backdrop of 
intense electoral competition during the post-Reconstruction period, 
congressional and executive officials of both parties clamored to 
curry favor with Sinophobic voters of the Far West by enacting the 
first Chinese exclusion laws in the 1880s.38 During the interwar 
years, the economic impact of immigration figured prominently in the 
minds of national officials, and they wasted no time in slowing 
immigration to all but a trickle during the 1920s and 1930s. But the 
centerpiece of this period’s restrictive immigration policies, a so-
called national origins quota system, was deeply informed by a new 
scientific theory—eugenics—that reinvigorated old distinctions 
between desirable and unworthy immigrants on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, and religion.39  
The new quota system was explicitly planned to favor northern 
and western European immigrants, and to exclude Asians, Africans, 
as well as southern and eastern Europeans. At the same time, 
Mexican migrants were viewed by most officials as a returnable labor 
force—due to a contiguous border—which could meet the nation’s 
shifting demands for low-skill labor without making any permanent 
claims for membership in U.S. society.40 Until the 1960s, U.S. 
 
TIMOTHY J. HATTON & JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, THE AGE OF MASS MIGRATION: CAUSES AND 
ECONOMIC IMPACT (1998). 
 37. See FUCHS, supra note 36; ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS 
OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997); KING, DIVERSE DEMOCRACY, supra note 34; KING, 
AMERICAN NATION, supra note 34. 
 38. See ELMER C. SANDMEYER, THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1973); 
GWENDOLYN MINK, OLD LABOR AND NEW IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT: UNION, PARTY, AND STATE, 1875–1920 (1986); ROGER DANIELS, COMING TO 
AMERICA: A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICAN LIFE (1990); KING, 
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY, supra note 34. 
 39. See JOHN HIGHAM, SEND THESE TO ME: JEWS AND OTHER IMMIGRANTS IN URBAN 
AMERICA (1975); FUCHS, supra note 36; SMITH, supra note 37; KING, DIVERSE DEMOCRACY, 
supra note 34. 
 40. MARK REISLER, BY THE SWEAT OF THEIR BROW: MEXICAN IMMIGRANT LABOR IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 1900–1940 (1976); KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO 
PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE INS (1992). 
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immigration essentially reflected these policy goals; northern and 
western Europeans comprised most overseas immigration to the 
country, while Mexican and other Latin American newcomers were 
typically admitted as guestworkers subject to removal whenever their 
labor was not in demand.41 The American state’s influence on 
immigration flows before 1945 captures not only its responsiveness 
to changing economic conditions but also its pursuit of foreign policy 
interests and ascriptive and hierarchic visions of racial order, which 
cannot be explained simply in economic terms. 
Whereas shifts in the U.S. business cycle comport well with 
immigration trends before the Second World War, they have diverged 
sharply on several occasions during the past sixty years. Despite an 
impressive postwar economic recovery, underscored by low 
unemployment rates and surges in GDP during the 1950s, the modest 
levels of U.S. immigration remained relatively stable. Immigration 
flows not only failed to keep pace with the postwar economic 
expansion as predicted by the push-pull model, but they in fact 
declined in the early 1950s. To understand declining immigration 
amidst economic growth requires knowledge of how government 
policies shaped immigrant admissions independently of postwar 
economic developments. Although both the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations called for more expansive immigration policies, their 
efforts were derailed by restrictionist committee chairs in Congress 
who vigilantly defended national origins quotas. During the early 
1950s, anticommunist isolationists in Congress secured legislation 
that reaffirmed national origins quotas while constructing new 
immigration barriers intended to tighten national security.42 In short, 
McCarthyism overshadowed economic growth in the immigration 
realm. Later in the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration took 
autonomous executive action to grant admissions above the existing 
quota ceiling, not in response to changing economic conditions but to 
 
 41. JUAN RAMON GARCIA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN 
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954 169–70 (1980). MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: 
ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2004). 
 42. Daniel J. Tichenor, The Politics of Immigration Reform in the United States, 1981–
1990, 3 POLITY 333, 343–45 (1994); TICHENOR, supra note 11, at 176. 
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offer refuge to Hungarians and others fleeing Communism—in this 
instance foreign policy trumped immigration policy. 
The demise of the national origins quota system finally came with 
the enactment of the Hart-Celler Act of 1965,43 an event that was 
undoubtedly fortified by national prosperity. But reformers in the 
executive and legislative branches had far more than the economic 
utility of immigration in mind when they embraced a new visa 
preference system. In making immigration reform an important 
feature of the Great Society juggernaut, the White House and its 
congressional allies argued that discriminatory national origins 
quotas—like domestic racial barriers—undermined American global 
prestige and influence amidst urgent Cold War competition. Civil 
rights and foreign policy interests loomed large in immigration 
policymaking of the 1960s. The 1965 law replaced national origin 
quotas with a new emphasis on uniting families, providing an 
unlimited number of immigrant visas to immediate family members 
of U.S. citizens; most numerically-limited visas went to other close 
relatives of citizens and the immediate family of permanent resident 
aliens. Remaining visa slots were allocated to refugees and skilled 
workers. Policymakers were careful to stipulate that the 1965 
immigration reform was strictly designed to remove ethnic, racial, 
and religious biases from the immigration code—not to expand the 
volume of annual legal admissions.44 
Although expected by its architects primarily to benefit European 
migrants, the family-based system established in 1965 would spur 
unprecedented Third World immigration to the United States as a 
result of unanticipated chain migration during the next quarter-
century. When asked at a Senate hearing whether the new law would 
alter the composition of immigrant flows, bringing more immigrants 
from Latin America and Asia, Attorney General Robert Kennedy 
insisted that the law would have little impact on flows from 
nontraditional areas.45 But we now know that the Hart-Celler Act 
contributed to a dramatic shift in the composition of U.S. 
 
 43. Hart-Celler Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965). 
 44. DAVID REIMERS, STILL THE GOLDEN DOOR: THE THIRD WORLD COMES TO AMERICA 
67–70 (1985). 
 45. REIMERS, supra note 44, at 77. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 7 Hollifield Tichenor book pages.doc 8/12/2008 3:47:00 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 27:7 
 
 
immigration, even though it did not substantially expand legal 
immigration; somewhat surprisingly, annual admissions increased 
only incrementally during the decade following its passage.46  
Against the backdrop of economic stagnation in the 1970s, 
characterized by high levels of inflation and unemployment, public 
opinion strongly supported significant decreases in legal 
immigration.47 Illegal immigration also drew attention as a prominent 
policy problem. New calls for immigration restriction and stronger 
border control were consistent with the economic logic of the push-
pull model. Economic stagnation and decline in the United States and 
other receiving countries in the 1970s brought renewed pressure for 
lower levels of immigration. Yet the push-pull model could not 
anticipate formidable political resistance from a number of 
strategically-situated lawmakers and special interests, like the 
growers in California and the Southwest, who supported large-scale 
immigration and who postponed policy action during economic hard 
times by brokering support for a bipartisan commission to study 
immigration—the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee 
Policy.48 
After several years of political stalemate, Congress finally enacted 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act49 (IRCA) in 1986 to address 
illegal immigration. Initially designed to discourage unlawful entries 
by severely penalizing U.S. employers who knowingly hired 
undocumented aliens, the law’s final employer sanctions provision 
lacked sufficient teeth to meet its purposes. IRCA’s most significant 
legacy was an amnesty program that granted legal status to record 
numbers of undocumented immigrants residing in the country.50 
Troubled by the civil liberties violations and discriminatory effect of 
past deportation campaigns, national officials embraced amnesty as a 
 
 46. See supra fig.2. 
 47. JOEL S. FETZER, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 
FRANCE, AND GERMANY (2000). 
 48. See FUCHS, supra note 36; ELLIS COSE, A NATION OF STRANGERS (1992); TICHENOR, 
supra note 11; Gary P. Freeman, Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States, 
22 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 881, 886 (1995); Christian Joppke, Why Liberal States Accept 
Unwanted Migration, 50 WORLD POL. (VOL. 2) 266, 271–81 (1997). 
 49. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1986). 
 50. Joppke, supra note 48, at 276. 
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more palatable policy solution.51 This would not be the case in the 
failed immigration reforms early in the twenty-first century. In fact, 
the inability of the federal government to implement employer 
sanctions and step up internal enforcement would be a major reason 
for opposition to amnesty in the 2007 immigration debate.  
Even as illegal immigration continued unchecked and 
unemployment levels swelled as a result of recession in the early 
1990s, national policy-makers passed a measure, the Immigration Act 
of 1990,52 which expanded immigration admissions. Increasing 
annual visas for immigrants with family ties to U.S. citizens and 
permanent resident aliens, those with needed job skills, and those 
from countries disadvantaged under the 1965 preference system, 
policy-makers defied the push-pull model in 1990 by substantially 
expanding legal immigration opportunities despite an important 
economic downturn.53 However, increased public concern regarding 
both legal and illegal immigration—especially the passage of the 
California ballot initiative, Proposition 18754 in 1994—did prompt 
national policymakers to consider restrictive immigration measures. 
In 1996, Congress came close to passing a bill that would have 
significantly scaled back annual legal immigration against the 
backdrop of robust economic growth and scant unemployment. In the 
end, however, the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act55 (IIRAIRA) targeted immigrants (both legal and 
illegal) through the mechanism of welfare reform and restriction of 
due process rights.56 But, thanks to the intense lobbying efforts of 
high-tech industries, such as Intel and Microsoft, legal immigration 
levels were left unchanged and skilled immigration received a boost 
through the H1-B program, while new measures were adopted to 
curtail illegal immigration. Apart from increased border controls and 
a small pilot program to force employers to check the legal status of 
workers before hiring them, the main impact of the IIRAIRA was to 
 
 51. Tichenor, supra note 42, at 349. 
 52. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1990). 
 53. Peter H. Schuck, The New Immigration and the Old Civil Rights, 15 AM. PROSPECT 
102, 102–11 (1993). 
 54. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187 (West). 
 55. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. 
 56. Id. 
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cut AFDC and SSI for legal immigrant residents—cutbacks that 
were, at the insistence of the Clinton administration, eventually 
restored for certain groups of resident aliens.  
The consequential interests and actions of the American state 
concerning immigration more than occasionally have transcended the 
economic predictors of the push-pull model, as well as straight 
interest-based explanations à la Freeman.57 Reducing U.S. 
immigration levels to a basic economic causality or to a strict interest 
group dynamic is inadequate in both explanatory and predictive 
terms. The United States, like other major immigrant receiving 
countries in the post-World War II era, is trapped in a liberal paradox, 
needing to maintain adequate supplies of (skilled and unskilled) 
foreign labor, while struggling to maintain control of its borders, 
preserve the social contract, and all the while protecting the rights of 
immigrants. We gain little by denying the powerful influence of 
changing domestic economic conditions over immigration. But 
understanding the political economy of immigration requires us to 
weigh the relative importance of economic and political factors. To 
understand and distinguish the influence of economic forces and 
government actions on U.S. immigration requires us to develop a 
preliminary (multivariate) model that incorporates the two. 
IV. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. IMMIGRATION 
Toward this end we constructed a time-series model that enables 
us to separate economic and political effects. The results of the 
analyses are presented in Tables 1–3. We used the log of immigration 
flows (the dependent variable) in our models in order to meet the 
model requirements of linearity and stationarity. We then calculate an 
impact range from the coefficients of each predictor variable by 
multiplying the coefficient by the highest and lowest value of that 
variable. This impact range allows for a greater ease of interpretation 
and discussion of the model results. Both the coefficients and the 
impact range are reported in the tables.  
The first thing to note is that, conforming to the conventional 
wisdom, economic conditions in the receiving country, in this case 
 
 57. See generally Freeman, supra note 48. 
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the United States, have a significant impact on legal immigration 
flows. Specifically demand-pull forces, as measured by 
unemployment rates have a modest impact on flows in the United 
States for the period 1891–2003. The coefficients, which assess the 
influence of a unit change (here 1%) in unemployment on 
immigration flows (logged annual legal immigration), is -.03 and 
significant at the .05 level. In the model, we control for a variety of 
policy interventions (specified as the five most important 
immigration acts passed during this time-span), as well as the 
dampening effects of World Wars I and II. Note that labor market 
conditions have almost twice the impact of changes in the other 
predictor, real GDP, which again conforms to the economic literature. 
TABLE 1 
LABOR MARKET AND POLICY EFFECTS ON IMMIGRATION,  
1891–2003 
 Impact T Impact Range 
(low–high) 
Labor Market 
(% Unemployed) 
-.03 
(.01) 
-4.8** -.40 -8.22 
Real GDP 
(% change) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-1.5 .12 -.17 
WWI -.56 
(.15) 
-3.8** 0.0 -.56 
WWII -.40 
(.15) 
-2.6** 0.0 -.50 
1924 Johnson-
Reed Act 
-.39 
(.12) 
-3.4** 0.0 -.4 
1952 McCarran-
Walter Act 
.10 
(.12) 
.9 0.0 .11 
1965 Hart-Celler 
Act 
-.07 
(.09) 
-.8 0.0 -.07 
1986 IRCA/ 
1990 Imm. Act 
.15 
(.10) 
1.4 0.0 .15 
Lagged Logged 
Immigration 
.69 
(.05) 
12.7** 6.93 9.95 
N=113 r2=.90 D-W=1.8 F=125.7 Sig.=.00 
DV=logged annual legal immigration  
*Significant at the .05 level, one directional test (standard errors in parentheses) 
**Significant at the .10 level 
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TABLE 2 
LABOR MARKET AND POLICY EFFECTS ON IMMIGRATION, 1891–1945 
 Impact T Impact Range 
(low-high) 
Labor Market 
(% Unemployed) 
-.03 
(.01) 
-2.8* -.04 -.75 
Real GDP 
(% change) 
-.01 
(.00) 
-.76 .09 -.13 
WWI -.56 
(.18) 
-2.9* 0.0 -.56 
WWII -.32 
(.21) 
-1.5 0.0 -.32 
1924 Johnson-
Reed Act 
-.46 
(.17) 
-2.5* 0.0 -.46 
Lagged Logged 
Immigration 
.71 
(.08) 
8.8* 7.1 9.93 
N=55 r2=.90 D-W=1.8 F=82.4 Sig=.00 
Dependent Variable: logged annual immigration 
*Significant at the .05 level, one directional test (standard errors in parentheses) 
**Significant at the .10 level 
  
TABLE 3 
LABOR MARKET AND POLICY EFFECTS ON IMMIGRATION, 1946–2003 
 Impact T Impact Range 
(low-high) 
Labor Market 
(% Unemployed) 
.02 
(.02) 
.9 .06 .18 
Real GDP 
(% change) 
-.01 
(.01) 
-.7 .08 -.06 
1952 McCarran-
Walter Act 
.00 
(.09) 
.0 0.0 .00 
1965 Hart-Celler 
Act 
.24 
(.11) 
2.2* 0.0 .24 
1986 IRCA/ 
1990 Imm. Act 
.30 
(.10) 
3.1* 0.0 .3 
Lagged Logged 
Immigration 
.55 
(.09) 
5.8* 5.73 7.86 
N=58 r2=.90 D-W=1.78 F=93.56 Sig=.00 
Dependent variable: logged annual legal immigration 
*Significant at the .05 level, one directional test (standard errors in parentheses) 
**Significant at the .10 level 
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Recalling our argument developed in the first sections of this 
Paper, we predicted a weakening of economic effects over time, as 
immigration policies changed to reflect the rise of rights-based 
politics, a new legal culture, and more expansive definitions of 
citizenship and membership,58 especially during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Accordingly, we segmented the data into two (pre- and post-war) 
periods. Table 2 reports the effects of political and economic change 
on flows from 1891–1945. Once again, we find a highly significant 
labor market effect while real GDP registers no statistically 
significant effect. Percent change in unemployment has a strong, 
inverse relationship with legal immigration flows (ω = -.03, 
significant at the .05 level). The corresponding impact range tells us 
that for every one percent change in unemployment, there is a 
decrease in the logged values of immigration ranging from -.04 to -
.75 of a one point change. When we refer back to the actual annual 
immigration levels, this corresponds to the level range of a low of 
23,068 immigrants in this period to a high of 1,285,349 immigrants. 
In the pre-war period, percent change in real GDP has no statistical 
significance.  
We also controlled for the effects of World Wars I and II and the 
1924 National Origins Act59 (the Johnson-Reed Act), which wrote 
into law the principle of racial/ethnic exclusivity. The First World 
War had an obvious and highly significant effect on immigration 
flows, as did the 1924 policy intervention. We measure policy 
interventions as dummy variables (0,1) so that the calculation of the 
minimum value will always be zero. The ranges for both World War 
I and for the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act reflect our expectations. The 
First World War curtailed flows during this period (as evidenced by 
the negative sign). The 1924 Act also reduced immigration 
dramatically (with a coefficient of -.46), showing the power of the 
state to restrict immigration flows during this period, marked by 
isolationism (in foreign policy), protectionism (in trade policy), and 
restriction of immigration. World War II, however, does not have a 
 
 58. See WAYNE A. CORNELIUS, PHILIP L. MARTIN & JAMES A. HOLLIFIELD, 
CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2004); SCHUCK, supra note 17. 
 59. National Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 90, §§ 11(b), 13(c), 43 Stat. 153, 159 (National 
Origins Act) (repealed 1952). 
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statistically significant impact on flows. This meets our expectations 
that as policies and World War II curtailed immigration flows, these 
interventions decreased the capacity of prior immigration streams to 
draw more immigrants into the country. Mean immigration for the 
entire period averaged 4.3 percent per annum. Thus, even when 
controlling for policy interventions and both world wars, labor 
market conditions had a sizeable and significant impact on 
immigration flows in the prewar period—a reflection in part of the 
contracting of the U.S. economy during the Great Depression. 
Table 3 reports the results for the period 1946–2003. Several 
interesting and counterintuitive findings stand out. Tellingly, 
economic demand-pull effects in the United States continue to 
weaken over time despite a more highly integrated global labor 
market, associated improvements in transportation and 
communication, and more efficient migration networks much in 
evidence.60 Indeed, the coefficients for unemployment and real GDP 
change show no significant effect for the postwar period. The 
McCarran-Walter Act of 195261 is not statistically significant. The 
contours of the Act corroborate the statistical evidence. The 
McCarran-Walter Act62 resulted in only marginal changes to key 
restrictionist quota provisions of the 1924 National Origins Quota 
Act. 
A number of policy interventions, by contrast, are significant. 
Surprisingly the Immigration and Nationality Act of 196563 (Hart-
Celler), which often is cited as the most important immigration 
reform since the 1924 law,64 has less of an empirical effect on legal 
immigration flows than other postwar reforms. The caveat, of course, 
is that the 1965 Act led to a gradual change in the composition of 
these flows, by stimulating family unification (which was, after all, 
 
 60. See MASSEY, ALARCON, DURAND & GOZALEZ, supra note 8; MASSEY, DURAND & 
MALONE, supra note 10; SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION (1996). 
 61. McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 110–131, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 64. See REIMERS, supra note 44. 
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the purpose of the law) and encouraging larger flows from non-
European sources (which was an unintended consequence). Two 
major immigration reforms of the late twentieth century, the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 198665 (IRCA) and the 1990 
Immigration Act,66 however, combined to have an influence on 
immigration that simply dwarfed all others modeled here. In sum, our 
model shows the significant influence of economic factors on 
immigration until 1946 and the growing impact of government 
actions on flows in the postwar period. Our time-series analysis 
fundamentally challenges presumptions of much of the economic and 
sociological literature on immigration, that policy interventions of the 
American state have had at best a marginal effect on immigration 
levels. It underscores the influence of both changing economic 
conditions and government actions on U.S. immigration during the 
past century. In the post-World War II period, immigration flows are 
heavily influenced by the rise of rights-based politics and the 
increasing prominence of rights-markets coalitions in U.S. politics, 
especially during the cold war era (1947–1990). We now turn our 
attention to analysis of these coalitions and their impact on U.S. 
immigration policy and the emergence of the U.S. as a migration 
state. 
V. RIGHTS-MARKETS COALITIONS 
Policy interventions (by themselves) are perhaps not the best 
measures of the rise of rights-based politics. As a proxy measure of 
rights-based politics and its impact on immigration flows, we 
incorporated an electoral (left v. right) effect into our time series 
model, using democratic and republican administrations. Not 
surprisingly, we found no significant association between the two 
administrations. Looking at the history of immigration politics and 
policy, it is hard to find a clear partisan split, with both parties 
lurching from one consensus to another—for restriction or 
admission—depending upon the historical context.67 Indeed as noted 
 
 65. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)–(b), 1255(d), 1160, 1187–88, 1364–65 (1986). 
 66. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186(b), 1252(b), 1254(a), 1288, 1304, 1324(c) (1986). 
 67. For a discussion of the historical context surrounding immigration reform, see FUCHS, 
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by Zolberg, immigration politics in the United States often creates 
strange bedfellows of the (economically liberal) Republican right, 
and the (politically liberal) Democratic left.68 
As a way of exploring this rights-markets dynamic, we looked at 
the history of voting on civil rights, immigration and trade in the 
Congress, from the 1964 Civil Rights Act69 through various trade and 
immigration measures in the 1990s, including NAFTA,70 Fast-Track 
authorization, as well as the 1990 and 1996 immigration acts. What 
we expect to find is a great deal of consistency in voting on these 
issues over roughly a thirty-year period, but with a breakdown of the 
coalition starting in 1990 with the end of the Cold War. To this end 
we looked dyadically at voting on eight bills in the Senate and the 
House: (1) the 1964 Civil Rights Act71 and the 1965 Immigration and 
Nationality Act;72 (2) the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control 
Act73 (IRCA) and the 1988 Canadian American Free Trade 
Agreement74 (CAFTA); (3) the Immigration Act of 199075 and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement76 (NAFTA); and (4) the 1994 
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade enactment77 (GATT) and 
the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act78 (IIRAIRA). 
 
supra note 36; Tichenor, supra note 42, at 343; Daniel J. Tichenor, Immigration and Political 
Community in the United States, in NEW COMMUNITARIAN THINKING: PERSONS, VIRTUES, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNITIES Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995; TICHENOR, supra note 11, at 16. 
 68. Zolberg, supra note 5, at 221. 
 69. Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). 
 70. North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 296 (1993). 
 71. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000a–h (2000)). 
 72. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–236, 79 Stat. 
911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 73. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 
(codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 74. Central America-Dominion Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement (DR-
CAFTA), Aug. 5, 2004, 119 Stat. 462, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/ 
Regional/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR-Final-texts/Section_Index.html (adopted by the United States 
on July 29, 2005). 
 75. 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a et seq. 
 76. NAFTA, supra note 70. 
 77. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 (1947). 
 78. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), Div. C. 
Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
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TABLE 4 
ROLL CALL VOTING ON RIGHTS, MARKETS, AND IMMIGRATION 
ISSUES, U.S. SENATE 
1964 Civil Rights and 1965 Immigration and National Acts 
 Rights INA 
 76–18 76–18 
D 46–18 52–15 
R 30–0 24–3 
SD+ 4–18 9–19 
Same-way voting: 82% (N=75) 
Canadian-American Free Trade Agreement and the Immigration Reform and 
Control Acts 
 Markets IRCA 
 83–9 75–21 
D 43–7 41–4 
R 40–2 34–17 
SD+ 10–0 11–1 
Same-way voting: 68% (N=54) 
North American Free Trade Agreement and Visa Quota Restriction Acts 
 Markets VQR 
 61–38 81–17 
D 27–18 40–14 
R 23–10 41–3 
M* 7–5 10–2 
Same-way voting: 71% (N=45) 
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade and  
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts 
 Markets IIRAIRA 
 76–24 97–3 
D 41–13 44–3 
R 35–11 53–0 
SD+ 10–2 10–2 
M*   
Same-way voting: 74% (N=88) 
   
Notes: +Southern Democrat. *Major immigration state. 
Source: The Congressional Record. 
 
Table 4 displays the comparisons of roll call voting on the bills in 
the Senate. By dyad and starting with the Senate, we found that the 
Civil Rights Act and the 1965 INA passed by exactly the same vote 
(76 aye and 18 nay), with the principal opposition coming from 
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Southern Democrats, who voted 4–18 against Civil Rights and 9–13 
against the INA. Eighty-two percent (N=75) voted the same way on 
the two bills, indicative of a growing rights coalition and a close 
affinity between issues of civil rights and immigration, with the bowl 
weevils in the minority. Over twenty years later, the rights-markets 
coalition, including left-liberal Democrats and right-liberal or 
libertarian (free market) Republicans, is still intact. When we look at 
voting on the next dyad, IRCA and CAFTA, the vote was 75–21 for 
the former and 83–9 for the latter. Here we see more dissent on the 
immigration issue and less on trade, perhaps because trade with 
Canada is not viewed as terribly threatening for any major interest or 
constituency. Still the coalition is not as strong as it was in the 1960s, 
with only sixty-eight percent of the senators voting the same way on 
the two bills (N=54). If we break out seven high immigration states 
(California, Texas, Florida, New York, Illinois, New Jersey, and 
Massachusetts), we find overwhelming support for both measures, 
with only one dissenting vote (on IRCA) among senators from these 
states. 
Voting on the third dyad (the 1990 Act and NAFTA) in the Senate 
shows the continued strength of the rights-markets coalition, even 
well into the post-Cold War period. The vote was 81–17 in favor of 
the 1990 Act and 61–38 for the NAFTA. In this case seventy-one 
percent of the senators (N=45) voted the same way. In the seven high 
immigration states (see above), the vote was more nuanced, 7–5 in 
favor of NAFTA and 10–2 for the 1990 Act. In the last dyad (GATT 
and the 1996 Immigration Act), we see a reversal in policy direction 
in regards to the immigration act, but a maintenance in the strength of 
the right-markets coalition. The votes for the two acts are 76–24 for 
GATT and 97–3 for the new restrictive immigration act, which was 
supposed to focus on illegal immigration but included provisions for 
limiting legal immigrant access to social service benefits. The 
Republican vote on IIRAIRA was 53–0 and 35–11 for the enactment 
of the GATT agreements, compared to the Democratic tally of 44–3 
for the 1996 immigration act and 41–13 for GATT. Seventy-three 
percent of the Senators voted the same way on the two measures 
(N=88). Thus, at least in the Senate, the rights-markets coalition has 
remained relatively strong throughout the period, with two thirds to 
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three fourths of the members voting the same way on issues of rights, 
markets, and immigration.  
TABLE 5 
ROLL CALL VOTING ON RIGHTS, MARKETS, AND IMMIGRATION 
ISSUES, U.S. HOUSE 
1964 Civil Rights and 1965 Immigration and National Acts 
 Rights INA 
 289–126 320–69 
D 159–91 202–59 
R 136–35 118–10 
SD+ 12–88 36–52 
Same-way voting: 65% (N=222) 
Canadian-American Free Trade Agreement and the Immigration Reform and 
Control Acts 
 Markets IRCA 
 336–40 230–166 
D 215–30 168–61 
R 151–10 62–105 
SD+ 136–9 91–61 
Same-way voting: 52% (N=153) 
North American Free Trade Agreement and Visa Quota Restriction Acts 
 Markets VQR 
 234–200 231–192 
D 102–156 186–65 
R 132–43 45–127 
M* 93–76 101–57 
Same-way voting:34% (N=92)  
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade and Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Acts 
 Markets IIRAIRA 
 288–146 305–123 
D 167–89 76–117 
R 121–56 229–5 
Same-way voting: 58% (N=340) 
   
Notes: +Southern Democrat. *Major immigration state. 
Source: The Congressional Record. 
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However, this pattern does not hold in the House, the body which 
has a history of being more protectionist on trade issues79 and more 
nativist/restrictionist on immigration matters.80 Table 5 shows House 
roll-call voting on these issues. On the first dyad (1964 Civil Rights 
Act and 1965 INA), the House votes were 289–126 for civil rights 
and 320–69 for immigration, again with chief opposition on both bills 
coming from the boll weevils. Southern Democrats voted 12–88 
against civil rights and 36–52 against immigration. In the House, 
voting consistency on this dyad was sixty-five percent (N=222), not 
nearly as high as in the Senate. 
On the second dyad (IRCA and CAFTA), the tallies in the House 
were 230–166 on the immigration issue (note that IRCA was 
designed to deal primarily with the problem of illegal immigration) 
and 366–40 on the issue of freer trade with Canada. In contrast with 
the Senate, we do not find strong bi-partisan support for these 
measures in the House. Republicans in the House opposed the IRCA 
by a vote of 62–105, while votes in our seven high-immigration states 
were much closer: 91–61 on NAFTA, compared to 136–9 on 
CAFTA. This is almost certainly an interest/constituency driven vote, 
in the sense that freer trade with Mexico is viewed as much more 
threatening than freer trade with Canada. Fifty-two percent of the 
representatives (N=153) voted the same way on IRCA and CAFTA. 
We can see more volatility in the coalition and the beginning of the 
breakdown of bipartisan, rights-markets (or strange bedfellow) 
coalitions.  
On the third dyad (the 1990 Act and NAFTA), the vote on 
reforming legal immigration was opposed by Republicans (45–127), 
as has been the case with the IRCA. Nevertheless, it passed by a vote 
of 231–192. The vote on NAFTA was a bit closer (234–200), with 
Democrats leading the opposition to this trade agreement. They voted 
102–156 against it. If we separate out the major immigration states, 
we can see that, on balance, they favored the immigration bill (101–
57), as well as the trade agreement (93–76). Overall, only thirty-four 
percent of the House members (N=92) voted the same way on the 
1990 immigration act and NAFTA.  
 
 79. See I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS (2005). 
 80. See TICHENOR, supra note 11. 
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In the fourth and final dyad, we can see significant division 
between Republicans and Democrats on the 1996 immigration act 
(IIRAIRA) but more coalition cohesion on the passage of the GATT 
agreement. IIRAIRA passed the House with a 305–123 vote. The 
vote count for GATT was much closer: 288 members supported 
while 146 members opposed the measure. Democrats opposed the 
immigration measure by a vote of 76–117, but Republicans 
overwhelmingly favored the bill (229–5). Democratic opposition to 
GATT was less severe than Democratic opposition to the 
immigration act. Both Democrats and Republicans favored GATT. 
The enactment had Democratic support of 167–89 and Republican 
support of 121–56 votes. Fifty-eight percent (N=340) of members 
voted the same way on these two measures.  
We can see a distinct difference between the two legislative 
bodies on trade and migration issues. The rights-markets coalition 
held together much better in the Senate, even with the end of the Cold 
War, whereas it has fallen apart in the House. How can we explain 
this divergence? At least three explanations are possible. First is that 
the Senate is simply less partisan (more bipartisan) than the House. 
The second explanation, which is closely linked to the first, is that the 
Senate is capable of taking a longer-term view (i.e., one less driven 
by an electoral dynamic) on the issues of trade and migration, both of 
which have important foreign policy dimensions. Finally, as noted 
above, the House is driven more directly by the interests of much 
smaller districts/constituencies, and is therefore more sensitive to any 
distributional (or allocational) consequences of trade and migration 
policies.81 Moreover, in the House, Democrats seem to form rights-
markets coalitions in support of trade and migration issues, while 
Republicans, who continue to support freer trade, have lost their 
attachment to rights, particularly in the immigration area. This is 
borne out in congressional votes on welfare reform legislation, 
particularly the IIRAIRA of 1996, as the Republican-controlled 
House pushed for eliminating welfare benefits for legal as well as 
illegal immigrants.  
 
 81. See DESTLER, supra note 79; TICHENOR, supra note 11. 
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CONCLUSION 
The last half of the 20th century has marked an important new 
chapter in the history of globalization. With advances in travel and 
communications technology, migration has accelerated, reaching 
levels not seen since the end of the 19th century. According to the 
United Nations, as of the beginning of the 21st century, roughly 200 
million people are living outside of their country of birth or 
citizenship.82 Even though this figure represents less than three 
percent of the world’s population, the perception is that international 
migration is rising at an exponential rate, and that it is a permanent 
feature of the global economy. It seems that economic forces 
compelling people to move are intensifying. Supply-push forces 
remain strong, while the ease of communication and travel have 
reinforced migrant networks, making it easier than ever before for 
potential migrants to gather the information that they need in order to 
make a decision about whether or not to move.  
To some extent supply-push forces are constant or rising and have 
been for many decades. However, demand-pull forces are variable, 
and as we can see in the case of the United States, political dynamics 
have an enormous influence on the direction, composition, and flow 
of immigrants. The emphasis our model places on markets, states and 
rights improves on the prevailing economic and sociological theories. 
It incorporates economic and political/legal effects in a manner that 
distinguishes their relative influence and provides a stronger overall 
account of immigration flows. Economic forces alone clearly are 
insufficient for this task. Bringing the state into immigration analysis 
offers greater promise for understanding the direction, composition, 
and flow of immigrants. As we have seen in our analysis of the U.S. 
case, electoral, foreign policy, and national security interests figure 
prominently in immigration politics, while focusing on economics 
and business cycles offers only a partial explanation at best. 
A model that integrates immigrants, markets and rights is more 
promising than push-pull or transnational models alone in accounting 
 
 82. The trend in international migration has been steadily upward since the end of World 
War II. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2000 
(2000); United Nations, infra note 86. 
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for the volume and composition of immigration flows. These findings 
are consistent with other studies of the political economy of 
immigration in Europe.83 While they do not contradict the emerging 
literature in political economy that focuses on interest-based 
explanations for changes in immigration policy,84 they do offer us an 
alternative, rights-based and institutional explanation for the rapid 
rise in immigration among industrial democracies in the late 
twentieth century.85 The liberal state has played and will continue to 
play a vital role in regulating levels of immigration. 
In the advanced industrial democracies, immigration has been 
trending upward for most of the post-World War II period, to the 
point that well over forty percent of the world’s migrant population 
resides in Europe and America, where roughly ten percent of the 
population is foreign born.86 International migration is likely to 
increase in coming decades, unless there is some cataclysmic 
international event, like war or economic depression. Even after the 
9/11 terrorist attack on the United States, the liberal democracies 
have remained relatively open to international migration. Global 
economic inequalities mean that supply-push forces remain strong, 
while at the same time demand-pull forces are intensifying.87 The 
growing demand for highly skilled workers, in the United States and 
across the OECD world, and the demographic decline in the 
industrial democracies create economic opportunities for migrants. 
Transnational networks have become more dense and efficient, 
linking the sending and receiving societies. These networks help to 
lower the costs and the risks of migration, making it easier for people 
to move across borders and over long distances. Moreover, when 
legal migration is not an option, migrants have increasingly turned to 
professional smugglers, and a global industry of migrant 
 
 83. See HOLLIFIELD, supra note 18. Alan E. Kessler, Distributional Coalitions, Trade, and 
the Politics of Postwar American Immigration (1998) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Mass.). 
 84. See Freeman, supra note 48; Kessler, supra note 83. 
 85. Kessler, supra note 83. 
 86. See U.N. Dep’t of Soc. and Econ. Affairs, Population Div., International Migration 
2006, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/256 (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.un.org/esa/ 
population/publications/2006Migration_Chart/Migration2006.pdf. 
 87. Jonas Widgren & Philip L. Martin, International Migration: A Global Challenge, 51 
POPULATION BULL. (VOL. 1) 1, 1–48 (1996). 
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smuggling—often with the involvement of organized crime—has 
sprung up, especially in the last decade of the 20th century. In the 
twenty first century, hardly a week passes without some news of a 
tragic loss of life associated with migrant smuggling.88  
But migration, like any type of transnational economic activity 
(such as trade and foreign investment), cannot and does not take 
place in a legal or institutional void. As we can see in the U.S. case, 
states have been and continue to be deeply involved in organizing 
and regulating migration. The extension of rights to non-nationals has 
been an extremely important part of the American story of 
international migration in the post-World War II period. For the most 
part, rights that accrue to migrants come from the legal and 
constitutional protections guaranteed to all “members” of society.89 
Thus if an individual migrant is able to establish some claim to 
residence on the territory of a liberal state, his or her chances of being 
able to remain and settle will increase. At the same time, 
developments in international human rights law have helped to 
solidify the position of individuals vis-à-vis the nation-state, to the 
point that individuals (and certain groups) have acquired a sort of 
international legal personality. This has led some analysts to 
speculate that we are entering a post-national era, characterized by 
“universal personhood”,90 the expansion of “rights across borders”,91 
and even “transnational citizenship”.92 Others have argued that 
migrants have become transnational, because so many no longer 
reside exclusively on the territory of one state,93 opting to shuttle 
between a place of origin and destination. This line of argument gives 
priority to agency as a defining feature of contemporary migrations, 
 
 88. DAVID KYLE & REY KOSLOWSKI, GLOBAL HUMAN SMUGGLING: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES (2001). 
 89. See HOLLIFIELD, supra note 18; James F. Hollifield, Ideas, Institutions, and Civil 
Society: On the Limits of Immigration Control in Liberal Democracies, 10 IMIS-BEITRÄGE 57, 
57–90 (1999). 
 90. YASEMIN SOYSAL, LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP (1994). 
 91. JACOBSON, supra note 20. 
 92. RAINER BAUBÖCK, TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP: MEMBERSHIP AND RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION (1994). 
 93. See Nina Glick Schiller, Transmigrants and Nation-States: Something Old and 
Something New in the U.S. Immigrant Experience, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
MIGRATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1999); PEGGY LEVITT, THE TRANSNATIONAL 
VILLAGERS (2001). 
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but it ignores the extent to which state policies have shaped the 
choices that migrants make. The migration state is almost by 
definition a liberal state, inasmuch as it creates a legal and regulatory 
environment in which migrants can pursue individual strategies of 
accumulation.  
But, as we have seen in the U.S. case, regulating international 
migration requires liberal states to be attentive to the (human or civil) 
rights of the individual. If rights are ignored or trampled upon, then 
the liberal state risks undermining its own legitimacy and raison 
d’être94 and anti-immigration policies may come into conflict with 
raison d’Etat. As international migration and transnationalism 
increase, pressures build upon liberal states to find new and creative 
ways to cooperate and to manage flows. The definition of the national 
interest and raison d’Etat have to take this reality into account, as 
rights become more and more a central feature of domestic and 
foreign policy. New international regimes will be necessary if states 
are to risk more openness, and rights-based (international) politics 
will be the order of the day.95  
In short, the global integration of markets for goods, services and 
capital along with the rise of rights-based politics at the domestic as 
well as the international level entail higher levels of international 
migration; therefore, if states want to promote liberal economic 
policies—freer trade and investment—and democratic politics 
generally, they must be prepared to manage higher levels of 
migration. Many states (like the United States, Canada, and other 
OECD countries) are willing, if not eager, to sponsor high-end 
migration, because the numbers are manageable, and there is likely to 
be less political resistance to the importation of highly skilled 
individuals. However, mass migration of unskilled and less educated 
workers is likely to meet with greater political resistance, even in 
situations and in sectors, like construction or health care, where there 
is high demand for this type of labor. In these instances, as we have 
seen in the U.S. immigration debates in 2007, the tendency is for 
governments to go back to the old guest worker models, in hopes of 
bringing in just enough temporary workers to fill gaps in the labor 
 
 94. Hollifield, supra note 89. 
 95. See HOLLIFIELD, supra note 18; Hollifield, supra note 22; Hollifield, supra note 27. 
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market, but with strict contracts between foreign workers and their 
employers that limit the length of stay and prohibit settlement or 
family reunification.96 The alternative is illegal immigration and a 
growing black market for labor—a Hobson’s choice.97 
The 19th and 20th centuries saw the rise of what Richard 
Rosecrance has labeled the trading state.98 The latter half of the 20th 
century has given rise to the migration state. In fact, from a strategic, 
economic and demographic standpoint, trade and migration go hand 
in hand. Because the wealth, power and stability of the state is now 
more than ever dependent on its willingness to risk both trade and 
migration,99 as the U.S. case shows. In the twenty first century, as in 
the nineteenth, global competitiveness, power, and economic security 
are closely related to a willingness to accept immigrants, both skilled 
and unskilled. Many European and Asian countries, specifically 
Japan, have been reluctant to follow the Canadian, American, and 
Australian examples of expansive legal immigration policies 
designed to enhance their material power and wealth. But, in one 
important respect, Europe has an advantage over the United States, 
and Canada or Australia for that matter. The European Union is not 
only creating a free trade and investment zone, but also a free 
migration area. It remains to be seen whether North America (and 
East Asia) will follow the European example and create a common 
labor market.  
Now more than ever, international security and stability are 
dependent on the capacity of states to manage migration. It is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for states to manage or control 
migration either unilaterally or bilaterally. Some type of 
multilateral/regional regime is required, similar to what the European 
Union has constructed for nationals of the member states. The E.U. 
model, as it has evolved from Rome to Maastricht to Amsterdam and 
 
 96. MARK J. MILLER & PHILIP L. MARTIN, ADMINISTERING FOREIGN-WORKER 
PROGRAMS (1982). 
 97. At this writing (in summer 2008) the U.S. Congress had failed to pass so-called 
comprehensive immigration reform, which included a new guest worker program. 
 98. ROSECRANCE, supra note 20. 
 99. See MICHAEL LUSZTIG, RISKING FREE TRADE: THE POLITICS OF TRADE IN BRITAIN, 
CANADA, MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES (Bert A. Rockman ed., University of Pittsburgh 
Press 1996); Hollifield, supra note 27. 
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beyond, points the way to future international migration regimes, 
because it is not based purely on homo economicus, but incorporates 
rights for individual migrants and even a rudimentary citizenship, 
which continues to evolve. The problem, of course, in this type of 
regional migration regime is how to deal with third country nationals 
(TCNs). As the European Union expands and borders are relaxed, the 
issue of TCNs, immigrants, and ethnic minorities becomes ever more 
pressing, and new institutions, laws, and regulations must be created 
to deal with them.100 In the end, the European Union, by creating a 
regional migration regime and a kind of supra-national authority to 
deal with migration and refugee issues, allows the member states to 
finesse, if not escape, the liberal paradox.101 Playing the good cop/bad 
cop routine and using symbolic politics and policies to maintain the 
illusion of border control helps governments fend off the forces of 
closure, at least in the short run.102 In the end, however, it is the 
nature of the liberal state itself and the degree to which openness is 
institutionalized and (constitutionally) protected from the “majority 
of the moment,” that will determine whether states will continue to 
risk trade and migration.103  
International migration, like trade, is a fundamental feature of the 
postwar liberal order. As states and societies, like the United States, 
have become more liberal and open, migration has increased. Will 
this increase in migration be a vicious or a virtuous cycle? Will it be 
destabilizing, leading the international system into greater anarchy, 
disorder, and war; or will it lead to greater openness, wealth, and 
human development? Much will depend on how migration is 
managed by the more powerful liberal states, especially the United 
States, because they will set the trend for the rest of the globe. To 
avoid a domestic political backlash against immigration, the rights of 
migrants must be respected and states must cooperate in building 
 
 100. ANDREW P. GEDDES, THE POLITICS OF MIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE 
(2003). 
 101. HOLLIFIELD, supra note 18. 
 102. Christopher Rudolph, Security and the Political Economy of International Migration, 
97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 603, 603–20 (2003). 
 103. James F. Hollifield, The Politics of International Migration: How Can We Bring the 
State Back In?, in CAROLINE B. BRETTEL & JAMES F. HOLLIFIELD, MIGRATION THEORY: 
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international and regional migration regimes. Even as states become 
more dependent on migration, they are likely to remain trapped in a 
liberal paradox for decades to come. 
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